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Abstract—We present a cyber-attack on packet-based time
synchronization protocols (PBTSP) with high-accuracy require-
ments. The cyber-attack is undetectable from the PBTSP’s
perspective and exploits a vulnerability that is in the nature of
all PBTSPs. It can be successfully performed regardless of the
cryptographic protocol that the PBTSP is protected with and
it is undetectable by the clock-servo algorithm inside the target
slave clock. To perform this cyber-attack, we built a “Delay Box”
capable of advancing or delaying a slave clock by introducing
a malicious offset of a few microseconds. We run experimental
tests to the delay box to prove the magnitude of the attack and
to confirm undetectability. We discuss possible countermeasures
for this type of attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are interested in sensor networks with high-accuracy in
a given time reference. For example, phasor measurement units
(PMUs) in transmission networks require a synchronization
accuracy of 1µs according to the standard; in distribution
networks, where such deployments are believed to occur in
the near future [1], PMUs require 100ns accuracy or less for
real-time state estimation [2], [3]. Another application for high
accuracy can be found in [4] where sub-ns synchronization
accuracy between clocks is required among 10,000 sensors to
trace galactic cosmic rays.
The state-of-the-art synchronization technology for achiev-
ing high-accuracy in time measurement is GPS. However,
in recent years, packet-based time synchronization protocols
(PBTSPs) with high accuracy (e.g., Precision Time Protocol
(PTP) [5]), have come to be of particular interest in sensor
networks because they provide enhanced security and can
work in cases where physical locations make GPS signal
inaccessible. Notwithstanding, in PBTSPs there remains a
vulnerability that cannot be corrected by cryptography and is
in the nature of all of them.
The vulnerability is based on the theory explained in
detail in [6], where the authors prove that in any PBTSP
it is impossible to measure asymmetries in the propagation
delay by the protocol itself, for instance, any difference in
the forward and backwards path must come from outside the
protocol. Therefore, every PBTSP makes an assumption on the
propagation delays between master and slave clocks: either
they are symmetric or the ratio in the propagation delays is
known. This assumption can be exploited by a delay attack.
In this paper we mount a delay attack against White Rabbit
(WR) [7]. WR is a technology that achieves high synchroniza-
tion accuracy (sub-ns). It combines several standard protocols
such as Synchronous Ethernet (Sync-E) [8], PTP and a precise
measurement of the reception timestamps (see appendix B in
[7] for details). Sync-E is used to distribute the frequency of the
master clock to the slaves; PTP is left for offset compensation,
which makes WR a target for delay attacks.
Depending on its magnitude and the application, the delay
attack could have disastrous consequences. Following the PMU
example, injecting a delay, which causes an offset of a few
µs, would mean errors in the order of a few mrad in the syn-
chrophasor estimation. In active distribution-networks (ADNs),
the phase-angle differences between buses are a few mrad as
well, therefore the delay attack could cause a domino effect
by altering the state-estimation, which alters grid-protection
applications that use it, which leads to fault-location errors
and blackouts [9].
In this paper we present the Delay Box, a device capable of
producing a delay that deceives the WR protocol and injects an
undetectable malicious offset of a few microseconds or more
either in the forward or in the backwards direction relative to
the master clock. The Delay Box operates at the physical layer
and is therefore undetected by any encryption or authentication
mechanism at layer 2 or above.
Mounting an attack with the Delay Box against, for exam-
ple, a smart grid, would not be a difficult task. Many overhead
lines contain an optical line with physical-layer repeaters
placed every few kilometers on the poles. Climbing up a pole
is all that one needs to do in order to insert a Delay Box in
the optical line.
In Section II we present a state-of-the-art analysis in delay
attacks to PBTSPs. In Section III we describe our attack
and provide an analysis of the WR offset-computation in the
presence of a delay attack. In Section IV we explain how the
attack can be unnoticed by the clock-servo. In Section V we
describe how to build the Delay Box. In Section VI we describe
the experiments and tests done on the Delay Box. In Section
VII we analyze possible countermeasures, and we conclude
the paper in Section VIII.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Security in PTP has been extensively studied in literature
[10], [11], [12]. However, delay attacks on PTP have not been
addressed in the same depth. In [13] there is a full description
of security requirements in PBTSPs, where delay attacks
are mentioned as high impact and “mechanisms” should be
included in the PBTSP implementation to protect against them.
In [14], the authors analyze delay attacks from a game-
theoretic perspective; they propose several attack vectors,
stating that a “successful strategy” manipulates the delay
asymmetry; as countermeasures they propose protecting the
protocol with multiple paths between master and slave clocks,
or with a drop-threshold taken from RTT measurements that
can be computed precisely. However, the study in [14] is
purely theoretical so no implementation is given, and they do
not provide a closed-form expression to calculate the injected
offset in the slave clock during the delay attack.
In [15], the authors study the implications of inserting an
asymmetric delay in NTP and PTP. However, their conclusions
about the effects of injecting a one-way delay in any direction
are not accurate, as we show in Section III-C. In [16], the
authors also analyze delay attacks: In their attack work-flow
they describe that the attacker should intercept and delay the
arrival time of both Sync and Delay Req packets. But we
show as in [14] that the best attack consists in delaying only
Sync or Delay Req packets, not both. The authors of [16]
also propose a countermeasure based on a threshold given by
the ratio between the clock rates of master and slave. We
did not find any other work that addresses the analysis for
undetectability or mentions how an undetectable delay attack
is implemented.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous work on
security for the WR protocol. WR uses a specific asymmetry
definition that makes our delay-attack analysis different from
[14], [15] or [16]. In addition, WR’s specification mandates
the use of bidirectional optic-fiber uplinks which requires
special handling, as explained in Section V. Nonetheless, for
other security-related analysis, any work done on PTP can be
transported to WR’s PTP engine.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE DELAY ATTACK
In this section we describe our attack, we provide an
overview of a standard WR’s offset-correction process and
an analysis of the malicious offset induced by a delay attack
either in the master-to-slave or the slave-to-master direction.
The notation used in this section is summarized in Table I.
A. Undetectable Delay Attack
Our goal is not only to inject a malicious offset to the
slave clock. We start our attack by adding a one-way delay
in the communication path between the master and slave
clocks. We know that the effect of this is an asymmetry
unknown to the protocol, which cannot be compensated by
itself. Depending on which direction we insert the one-way
delay in the communication path, we can make the slave clock
go ahead or behind the master clock.
Concretely, we proceed as follows. We insert into the
optical fiber used by WR, which typically is bidirectional, a
self-powered repeater box built by us. We bridge the gap in the
bidirectional fiber by two unidirectional fibers and appropriate
optical/electrical converters. In one direction we use a short
fiber (2m), and in the reverse direction we use a fiber coil of
one or several kilometers whose length is proportional to the
delay we want to introduce in the communication path.
To avoid being cut by cryptography, we use equipment that
operates in the physical layer, below any MAC-based or IP-
based security protocols.
Fig. 1. White Rabbit link delay model taken from [7]
Finally, we need to address the fact that the internal
oscillator of the WR slave clock is governed by a clock-servo
with a particular stiffness that limits the rate at which the
oscillator can change its time. The injected offset in a delay
attack could cause a step change in time which can produce an
error or alarm in the clock-servo. To address this problem, we
introduce the delay in the form of a ramp, with increments
that are small enough to be unnoticed by the clock-servo.
The computation of the largest possible increment is given
in Section IV.
B. Offset Estimation in WR
In this section, we present a brief theory on the WR’s
offset-estimation, that is used in the derivation of the malicious
offset induced by a delay attack, as described in Section III-C.
Table I gives the notation used in the rest of the section.
Typical PTP timestamps (t1, t4p for master’s timestamps
and t2p, t3 for slave’s timestamps) are used to compute the
round trip delay delayMM as
delayMM = (t2p   t1) + (t4p   t3) (1)
where subscript p refers to the precise measurement of the
timestamp (see Section B.5 of [7]). delayMM can be computed
correctly regardless of the offset between the master and slave
clocks. The link-delay model used in WR is depicted in Figure
1. The WR specification [7] assumes fixed delays are due to
transmission/reception circuitry and variable delays are due to
transmission media. Under these assumptions, we can express
the delay between master and slave as the sum of the circuitry
and transmission media delays
delayMS =  TXM + RXS +  MS (2)
WR defines a relative delay coefficient ↵ (i.e. relationship
between propagation delays) given by
↵ =
 MS    SM
 SM
(3)
delayMM can also be written as the sum of the delays in the
transceivers and fibers
delayMM =  +  MS +  SM (4)
where   =  TXM + RXS + TXS + RXM . From 3 and
4 we can write
 MS =
1 + ↵
2 + ↵
(delayMM   ) (5)
From 2 and 5
delayMS =  TXM + RXS +
1 + ↵
2 + ↵
(delayMM   ) (6)
TABLE I. NOTATION USED THROUGH SECTION III.
Notation Meaning
Off Offset between master and slave clocks.
Negative when slave is ahead of master.
delayXY Total delay from X to Y . X,Y 2
{M,S}; X = Y denotes round trip delay.
 AX Transceiver and circuitry delays. A 2
{TX,RX}, X 2 {M,S}. Without sub-
script, denotes sum of all fixed delays.
 XY Delay in fiber from X to Y . X,Y 2
{M,S}; X = Y denotes round trip delay.
↵ Relative delay coefficient defined in Equa-
tion 3
DXY Total additional delay introduced from X
to Y in the delay attack, relative to the
unattacked case.
Exp Stands for the real value of Exp subject to
no attack.
Expatt Stands for the real value of Exp subject to
the delay attack.
Exp0 Value of Exp as considered by WR soft-
ware.
Finally, the slave’s clock offset is calculated in WR from one
ping timestamps and master-to-slave delay as
Off = t1   t2p + delayMS (7)
C. Derivation of the malicious offset induced by a delay attack
In this section we derive an expression for the clock offset
induced during a delay attack as a function of the delay DSM
[resp. DMS] introduced by the Delay Box from slave to master
[resp. from master to slave].
Equation 7 relates Off and delayMS at any given time
Offatt = t1   t2p + delayMSatt (8)
Off0 = t1   t2p + delay0MS (9)
Combining equations 8 and 9, and assuming Off0 = 0 when
WR protocol converges we have
Offatt = delayMSatt   delay0MS (10)
We can rewrite equation 2 in our terms as
delayMSatt =  TXM + RXS +  MS +DMS (11)
delay0MS =  TXM + RXS +  
0
MS (12)
By using 6 and considering that RTT can be measured
precisely by using PTP timestamps
delay0MS =  TXM + RXS +
1 + ↵
2 + ↵
(delayMMatt   )
delay0MS =  TXM + RXS +
1 + ↵
2 + ↵
( MS +  SM
+DMS +DSM )
(13)
Using 3, 10, 11 and 13, we have
Offatt = DMS   1 + ↵
2 + ↵
(DMS  DSM ) (14)
According to [7], the value of ↵ is typically small, thus we
can approximate 14 to
Offatt =
DMS  DSM
2
+
↵(DMS +DSM )
4
(15)
Equation 15 shows that an attack vector with DMS = DSM 6=
0 produces no damage for very small values of ↵ (which
is the typical case in WR networks). It also proves that the
slave’s clock can be either ahead or behind the master’s clock,
depending on the value of DMS and DSM .
IV. MAXIMUM DELAY INCREMENT
As discussed in Section III-A the delay inserted by the
Delay Box needs to be applied in small increments, to be
unnoticed by the clock servo. In this section, we provide a
formulation for such a maximum delay increment, say D⇤.
Regardless of the PBTSP, we can measure the frequency drift
of a slave clock referenced to the master clock with two
different sets of pings (exchange between Sync and Delay Req
messages). Using the same timestamping convention as Section
III-B (t1, t2p) and assuming two consecutive ping exchanges
k and n with n > k, we can express the frequency drift aslv
in the WR protocol by
aslv =
tn2p   tk2p
tn1   tk1
(16)
Note that aslv is bounded by the resultant frequency stability
given by Sync-E, such that 1  ⌘slv  aslv  1 + ⌘slv , where
⌘slv is the syntonization accuracy of the Sync-E’s syntonized
slave-clock expressed in PPM, which is upper-bounded by the
ITU-T G.8262 standard in 4.6PPM [8]. In the presence of an
attack, it follows that the frequency drift (1 + ⌘att) produced
by the attack has the form
1 + ⌘att = 1 + ⌘slv +
Di
TSync
(17)
where Di is the delay introduced by delay component i and
TSync is the sending period for the Sync messages correspond-
ing to tn1   tk1 . Let’s define the maximum frequency drift
update (in PPM) of the clock-servo in a slave as ⌘clk, then
we know that the attack is undetected by the clock-servo as
long as ⌘att  ⌘clk ⌘slv . Thus, by using Eq. 17 and applying
the constraints described we can find an expression for the
maximum delay increment that is unnoticed by the clock-servo
⌘slv +
Di
TSync
= ⌘att
⌘slv +
D⇤
TSync
 ⌘clk   ⌘slv
D⇤  TSync (⌘clk   2⌘slv)
The value of ⌘clk depends on the clock-servo’s implementation
and it can be metrologically characterized in the laboratory. In
our experiments we used ⌘clk = 5PPM [17], ⌘slv = 10PPB
thus D⇤ ⇡ 4.98µs.
V. THE MAKING OF THE UNDETECTABLE DELAY BOX
In this section we explain how we built the Delay Box,
illustrated in Figure 2. The Delay Box is composed of N in-
terconnected delay components, where each delay component
can be activated or deactivated using a control signal. All delay
components provide a fixed delay Di satisfying the property
Di := 2i 1D⇤, i = 1, 2, . . . , N , where D⇤ is the maximum
delay increment, as discussed in Section IV. The purpose of
this design is to implement a ramp, so that we can gradually
inject 2N 1 different delays to reach a target delay D without
Fig. 2. Delay Box diagram
Fig. 3. Diagram of a single delay component
being noticed by network operator. The set of delays that the
Delay Box is able to produce is in the range [0, 2N 1D⇤] by
increments of D⇤, and the largest injected delay Dmax is given
by
Dmax =
NX
i=1
Di =
 
2N   1 D⇤ (18)
The diagram for a single delay-component is depicted in
Figure 3. Each delay component consists of two optical-to-
electrical-to-optical transponders (OEOs). Each OEO is a 3-
Ports small form-factor pluggable (SFP) to SFP, 1.25G OEO
transponder manufactured by Fiberstore, with full 3R support
(reamplification, reshaping, retiming). The SFP interface help
us to support for either bidirectional or unidirectional fibers to
overcome the restriction imposed by WR, by mandating the
use of bidirectional fiber links.
The interfaces labeled with A and B from each OEO are
connected back-to-back, such that in each A interface there is
a very short fiber link (2m in our testbed). However, in the B
interface, we connect a very long fiber in one direction (e.g.,
TXleft to RXright), that is entangled in a coil to achieve
the desired delay Di. In the other direction (e.g, TXright to
RXleft) we use another very short fiber. Switching from A
interface to B interface and vice versa is manually triggered
by a digital input available on each OEO, such that both OEOs
switchover at the same time, without perturbing any hardware
link-down detection mechanism.
In our testbed we used a push button to manually trigger the
switchover of both OEOs. We connect the push button to the
trigger input of each OEO, using copper cables of same length
to ensure that both OEOs receive the signal at the same time.
By combining the trigger mechanism, the fact that the circuitry
that makes the switch over in the OEO is orders of magnitude
faster than the hardware link-down detection mechanism (⇡
50µs vs < 10ms), and the fully support of Sync-E, we can
prevent traffic disruption during the insertion or removal of
other delay components.
Summarizing, it is possible to have 2N  1 different delays
with a fixed D⇤ increment step. Note that our Delay Box
Fig. 4. Testbed used for the experiments at the laboratory.
requires only low-end, non-expensive equipment that is readily
available in any consumer optic-fiber shop.
VI. EXPERIMENTS WITH THE DELAY BOX
In this section, we present the experimental tests made on
the Delay Box. We define three cases based on the attacker’s
point of view: reference, when there is no Delay Box (i.e., no
attack in the system); silent, when we have inserted a Delay
Box but with all delay components deactivated (i.e., when
delay is set to D = 0); and active, when the Delay Box is
performing a delay attack to the system (i.e., whenD > 0). We
performed 100 independent measurements for measuring the
offset on each case (reference, silent, attacks), and we took 500
independent measurements for the measurements in Section
VI-C.
A. Hardware
An illustration of the testbed is shown in Figure 4. Master
and slave clocks are Simple PCIe FPGA mezzanine card
(FMC) Carriers (SPECs) inside a regular PC, that provides
power and console access. Each SPEC has a 5 channel FMC
digital I/O module and the specifications on this card can
be found in [18]. The dark boxes labeled with OEO are the
OEOs described in Section V. All OEOs and SFPs transceivers
come from the same manufacturer to help in symmetric design.
Transceivers facing the SPEC cards (WR’s master and slave
clocks) are bidirectional transceivers following the standard
described in [7]; all other transceivers are unidirectional
1000Base-LX SFPs. The coil is approximately 1km ±15m
long to meet the 4.98µs delay requirement. Any other fiber
used is 2m ±20cm long. All tests performed and reported in
this paper where done under the same temperature conditions
of 23°C ±1.
To prove synchronization and the effect of the attack, in one
of the FMC DIO’s channel we produce a PPS signal, and we
use a Rohde-Schwarz RTO 1044 oscilloscope with 10GS/s
sampling rate to measure the offset difference between the
master’s PPS and the slave’s PPS signal. We set the trigger on
the positive edge of the master’s PPS signal at 1.48V.
B. Attack results
In this section, we show the results from attacking with
one single delay component (i.e., from Eq. 18 we set N = 1,
D = D⇤ = 4.98µs). In figure 5 we show slave’s PPS in the
Fig. 5. Performance of the Delay Box with D = 0, in silent mode
Fig. 6. Impact of a delay attack using a Delay Box in the slave-to-master
direction with D = D⇤ = 4.98µs
reference case (blue dotted line) and the silent case (red lined)
against the master’s PPS (black solid). Note that the difference
between the PPS signals in the reference and the silent case
deviate by roughly 100ps. As typical WR synchronization
accuracy is a few hundreds of picoseconds [19], Figure 5
confirms that synchronization accuracy is not compromised in
the presence of the Delay Box in silent mode (with D = 0),
and thus confirms that the Delay Box in silent mode is truly
undetectable. Figure 6 shows the impact of the attack when
the Delay Box is placed in the slave-to-master direction with
D = D⇤ ⇡ 4.98µs; Figure 7 shows the same attack with
the Delay Box inserted in the opposite direction. We can see
that in both cases a malicious offset of  2.47µs and +2.47µs
injected in the slave clock depending on the placement of the
Delay Box. With these results we show that an attacker can
use the Delay Box to forward or delay a sensor’s clock at will.
C. Validation of experimental results
To validate the experimental results from Section VI-B on
the malicious offset injected by the Delay Box, we compare
them to the theoretical values obtained using the equations
described in Section III-C.
For the experimental results, the oscilloscope can give
Fig. 7. Impact of a delay attack using a Delay Box in the master-to-slave
direction with D = D⇤ = 4.98µs
directly the mean of the offset injected by the Delay Box
and its variance. For the theoretical estimation, recall from
Section III-C that DMS and DSM are the additional delays
that are introduced in the master-to-slave or the slave-to-master
directions in the presence of an attack. All OEO converters and
SFP transceivers come from the same manufacturer and we
assume all devices of the same kind produce the same delay.
Under this assumption, we can express the delay DMS and
DSM as
DMS =DCTDBMS +  1km
DSM =DCTDBSM +  2m
(19)
where DCTDBMS and DCTDBSM are the delays in the OEO
converters and SFP transceivers in the Delay Box in the master-
to-slave and the slave-to-master directions respectively;  1km
is the one-way delay of the 1km fiber coil and  2m is the
one-way delay of the 2m fiber.
To compute DMS and DSM we measure separately the
one-way delays  1km,  2m, DCTDBMS and DCTDBSM . For
measuring one-way delays, we follow the procedure suggested
by Section 4.2 of [20] and we take 100 samples for each
measurement.
After computing the theoretical offset using Eqs. 19 and 14,
we need to take into account the systematic errors incurred
during the experiments. We define the systematic errors as
the slave’s clock offset obtained by the experiments minus the
slave’s clock offset obtained by the theoretical estimation when
the Delay Box is set to a delay D = 0. The results showed
systematic errors of the order of 300ps with a 95% confidence
interval of the order of 15ps. Lastly, we subtract the systematic
errors from the experimental results to compare them to the
theoretical estimation.
When the Delay Box is inserted in the slave-to-master
direction, the theoretical estimation predicts that the injected
offset injected is  2.4681µs with an uncertainty of ±15ps at
95% confidence level. The measured offset is  2.4682µs with
an uncertainty of ca. ±200ps, which indicates a satisfactory
match. In the master-to-slave direction, the predicted offset is
2.4680µs± 15ps and the measured one is 2.4680µs± 200ps,
also indicating a satisfactory match.
VII. DISCUSSION
We propose the following countermeasures to delay at-
tacks:
1) Monitor the delayMM as reported by the software as
it increases by a large amount when the 1-km fiber is
present. However, in a real scenario this could be difficult
because network operators typically do not monitor the
RTT between all devices in a LAN, but just between
selected “core” network elements. Nonetheless, imagine
an attack where the network undergoes maintenance work
and a symmetric delay (DMS = DSM 6= 0) is initially
inserted by an insider. This action would increase the
delayMM , but is unlikely to be noticed as there would
be no effect on the time synchronization, and the increase
could be attributed to possible hardware changes during the
maintenance window. Later, an asymmetric delay can be
introduced without changing delayMM by transferring the
delay DMS to DSM or vice versa, which would make the
attack undetectable to RTT measurements. Still, continuous
monitoring and reporting of any suspicious changes in RTT
is probably one of the few effective countermeasures.
2) Use redundant and disjoint communication paths be-
tween master and slave clocks; or use redundant primary
reference-sources (GPS). Then, by using a voting or dis-
carding algorithm we could identify the delayed message
and take actions. Note that the discard algorithm would add
complexity to the clock-servo. The effectiveness of this
method assumes that the majority of the communication
paths (or majority of the primary reference-sources) are
not compromised by the attacker.
3) Use packet duplication. A robust implementation of a
redundancy protocol such as PRP [21] or iPRP [22] could
be used as a countermeasure. This will work assuming the
attacker cannot attack all the alternate paths at the same
time.
4) Prefer encryption over authentication in PBTSPs. Encryp-
tion prevents the attacker from retrieving information such
as Sync or Delay Req message frequency, which can be
used to calculate the maximum delay increment D⇤ as
shown in Section IV. However, the maximum message
frequency could be inferred, which could be use to derive
a conservative value of D⇤.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed and built a Delay Box out of components
that can be easily acquired in any fiber shop. We have
implemented a delay attack over a WR network, and we have
injected an offset of  2.47µs or +2.47µs that was undetected
by the protocol and unnoticed by the clock-servo. It did not
show any warning or error message, therefore it was also not
possible for a network operator to detect it. The consequences
of this delay attack can be of significance, specially in time
networks with high-accuracy requirements.
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